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Abstract
The modular exponentiation operation used in popular public key encryption
schemes, such as RSA, has been the focus of many side channel analysis (SCA) at-
tacks in recent years. Current SCA attack countermeasures are largely static. Given
sufficient signal-to-noise ratio and a number of power traces, static countermeasures
can be defeated, as they merely attempt to hide the power consumption of the system
under attack. This research develops a dynamic countermeasure which constantly
varies the timing and power consumption of each operation, making correlation be-
tween traces more difficult than for static countermeasures. By randomizing the
radix of encoding for Booth multiplication and randomizing the window size in ex-
ponentiation, this research produces a SCA countermeasure capable of increasing
RSA SCA attack protection.
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RSA POWER ANALYSIS
OBFUSCATION: A DYNAMIC
FPGA ARCHITECTURE
I. Introduction
In the groundbreaking 1999 paper [4], Kocher et al. presented a method to
recover a secret key from cryptographic hardware by monitoring the hardware’s
power consumption. In recent years, these so called side channel analysis (SCA)
attacks have become a focus of the cryptographic community. These attacks are
conducted by collecting power consumption data of the hardware, referred to as
power traces, over many cryptographic cycles, and statistically correlating this data
to the likely cryptographic key. These attacks allow an attacker to recover keys much
faster than traditional cryptanalysis.
The RSA public key encryption algorithm [5] has been the target of many of
these attacks. Current methods of SCA protection fall into two categories: masking
and hiding [6]. Masking introduces randomness into the input text such that there
is no correlation with power consumption. Hiding countermeasures obscure any
correlation by introducing electrical noise or designing the hardware in such a way
that minimizes the signal an attacker wishes to capture, thus making successful
attacks more difficult. The goal of both methods is to lower the signal to noise ratio
(SNR) to a level that makes the attack infeasible.
1.1 Motivation
In today’s ultra-connected society, virtually every facet of life involves the flow
of information over computer networks. From financial transactions through online
banking and Internet purchases, to personal information backed-up on the “cloud,”
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the need for a secure flow of information is as important as ever. RSA encryption, as
a part of SSL and TLS [7], is a major factor in that security. If a major bank or stock
market exchange were to succumb to attack, untold worldwide financial havoc would
result. Additionally, the United States Government authorizes the RSA algorithm
for electronic transmission of classified data [8]. Thus, protecting RSA encryption
from attack is key to national security.
In recent years side channel attacks have become an increasingly important
design consideration for cryptographic implementations. Observing the power con-
sumption of an RSA implementation can lend information about the operations,
timing, operands, and ultimately the secret keys. With a modest investment in
a digital oscilloscope and third party software, adversaries have the capability to
conduct such attacks with minimal knowledge of the system under attack. This
motivation drives research to develop a implementation resistant to side channel
attacks.
1.2 Problem Statement
Current SCA attack countermeasures are largely static. Given enough time and
a sufficient number of power traces, static countermeasures can be broken as they
merely attempt to increase the difficulty of attack to an infeasible level. However,
countermeasures are constantly changing, as in a dynamic architecture, timing and
power consumption would be a “moving target,” making correlation between traces
much more difficult than static countermeasures.
1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions
The goal of this research is to develop and synthesize an architecture on an
FPGA that is capable of protecting an RSA implementation from SCA attacks. This
dynamic architecture contains randomizations at each level of cryptographic opera-
tions, randomized multiplier used by randomized exponentiator. The hypothesis of
2
this research is that a dynamic circuit is capable of randomizing timing and power
consumption in such a manner that SCA attacks are no more successful than brute
force attacks.
This research provides a VHDL coded dynamic architecture for synthesization
on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. This architecture provides two-way communication with
Riscure Inspector’s side channel attack software for power trace acquisition and
analysis, as well as custom written MATLAB scripts implementing common side
channel attacks.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into five sections. Chapter 2 covers the background of
RSA encryption operations, side channel attacks against RSA, and known counter-
measures against side channel attacks. Chapter 3 covers the methodology used to
develop the design of experiments in this research. Chapter 4 covers the design of the
dynamic architecture and results from experimental SCA attacks. Lastly, Chapter 5
summarizes the work accomplished, major contributions, and recommendations for
future work in the area.
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II. Background
The following chapter covers the background of RSA encryption operations, side
channel attacks against RSA, and known countermeasures against side channel at-
tacks.
2.1 RSA Encryption Algorithm
In contrast to traditional symmetric key ciphers, public key encryption assigns
each member a private (secret) key and public key. The RSA public key encryption
scheme [5] shown in Figure 1 is based on the assumption that factorization of large
integers composed solely of two prime factors (i.e., modulus n) is computationally
infeasible in polynomial bounded time [9].
Figure 1: RSA Public Key Encryption [1]
This research focuses on the modular exponentiation operations of the cryptosystem.
Algorithm 1 shows the operations for encryption and decryption. In this provable
security cryptosystem, it is computationally infeasible, to a polynomial-time bound
attacker, to factor n to determine the private key.
2.1.1 Exponentiation Methods. Modern cryptographic algorithms use very
large integers for keys (e.g., 4096-bit RSA). Many public key cryptographic algo-
rithms, including RSA, rely on the modular exponentiation operation for encryp-
tion. Naively computing me via e− 1 multiplications of m is impractical because of
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Algorithm 1 RSA Algorithm [10]
Summary: B encrypts a message m for A, which A decrypts.
Encryption: B should do the following:
Obtain A’s authentic public key (n,e).
Represent the message as an integer m in the interval [0, n− 1]
Compute c = me (mod n)
Send the cipertect c to A.
Decryption: To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
Use the private key d to recover m = cd (mod n)
memory and timing constraints [10]. Therefore, algorithms are required to decrease
storage requirements and the number of steps required for the modular exponen-
tiation operation. These algorithms are known as square-and-multiply algorithms.
The algorithms represent the exponent (i.e., key) in binary and repeatedly compute
modular multiplication operations. These algorithms keep the memory space limited
as they perform modular reduction during exponentiation and complete after log2 d
iterations. Additionally, exponentiation methods can operate on a single bit of the
exponent (binary) or multiple bits of the exponent (k-ary) for a given iteration.
2.1.1.1 Binary Exponentiation Methods. Binary exponentiation is
the most straightforward method for exponentiation; operating on a single bit of
the binary representation of the exponent (key) each iteration. This process can
be performed either from the left-to-right (MSB to LSB) or right-to-left (LSB to
MSB). A square-and-multiply algorithm for left-to-right can be seen in Algorithm
2. Similarly, the square-and-multiply Algorithm 3 is shown for right-to-left binary
exponentiation. Note that the order of squaring and multiplying is reversed since
the exponent is now traversed LSB to MSB. Also note that left-to-right binary ex-
ponentiation only requires a single variable. Since many cryptographic systems are
under tight memory and area constraints (e.g., smart cards), the left-to-right variant
is more popular [11].
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Algorithm 2 Left-to-Right Binary Exponentiation [10]
INPUT: base m and exponent e = (et, et−1...e1, e0)2
OUTPUT: me
R := 1;
for i = k − 1 downto 0 do
R := R2 (mod N); —Square
if ei = 1 then then
R := R ·m (mod N); —Multiply
end if
end for
return R
Algorithm 3 Right-to-Left Binary Exponentiation [10]
INPUT: base m and exponent e = (et, et−1...e1, e0)2
OUTPUT: me
R0 := 1;R1 := m;
for i = 0 to k − 1 do
if ei = 1 then then
R0 := R0 ·R1 (mod N); —Multiply
end if
R1 := R
2
1 (mod N); —Square
end for
return R0
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2.1.1.2 K-ary (Windowing) Exponentiation Methods. It is also pos-
sible to operate on multiple bits of the exponent at once. For maximum efficiency,
the goal is to compute me using the fewest number of operations, given that it is
only possible to multiply two already computed powers of m [12]. Since multiple
bits are being operated on at once, there are fewer total operations needed. This
approach, referred to as windowing, provides some speedup. This speedup comes as
trade off of higher memory requirements. As seen in Algorithm 4, precomputation
and storage of additional powers of m are needed. The higher the window size k,
the less multiplication operations needed and more memory space required.
Algorithm 4 Constant Window Method [10]
INPUT: base m, window size k, and exponent e = (et, et−1...e1, e0)2
OUTPUT: me
PRECOMPUTE:
m0 := 1;
for i = 1 to 2k − 1 do
mi := mi−1 ·m; — Compute Powers For Window
end for
R := 1;
for i = k − 1 downto 0 do
R := R2
k
(mod N);
R := R ·mei (mod N); —Use Precomputed Powers
end for
return R
By maximizing the number of 0 exponent strings, it is possible to further min-
imize the number of operations, since 0 exponent bits do not require the additional
multiplication step. The Sliding Window method can be used to further lower the
number of required multiplications. The Sliding Window method is a modification
of Algorithm 4. Instead of choosing a constant window size, choose a maximum
window size k. Select up to k bits to operate on, with the goal being to select the
longest bitstring within the maximum window size with the last bit of the string as a
one. This reduces the number of multiplications and precomputations needed. These
methods have been extended in [13] and [14] with randomized windows to increase
7
obfuscation. Authors in [15], [16], explore optimal choice of high-radix Montgomery
multipliers for speedup and their side channel leakages. Several classical popular
methods for modular exponentiation have been shown. The next section discusses
attacks that exploit side channel leakages specific to each algorithm.
2.2 Side Channel Attacks
Prior to Kocher et al’s paper [4], cryptographers’ primary concern was tradi-
tional cryptanalysis against the primary plaintext to ciphertext information stream.
Nowadays, the security of public key encryption algorithms, including RSA, no longer
rely on only the provable security of the plaintext to ciphertext conversion. Imple-
mentors of cryptographic systems must consider a collection of design and coding
practices such that their implementations are not left open to side channel attacks.
Side channel attacks begin by collecting side channel information such as power con-
sumption or electromagnetic (EM) emissions [17] of the system under attack during
the encryption operation, known as collecting traces. Trace collection usually re-
quires physical access to the device via direct power consumption monitoring or via
EM probes. Side channel attacks can be classified as passive or active. Passive at-
tacks only require power traces and known messages, while active attacks require
chosen plaintext or fault interjection.
2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis (SPA). SPA involves directly observing power
traces to gather information about the secret key [4]. SPA leaks are caused by pro-
gramming conditional branch decisions based on secret keys or intermediate values.
For example, in binary exponentiation as described in Algorithm 2, if there is a
distinguishable difference between a squaring operation and a multiplying operation
(time or power), the implementation is vulnerable to SPA. Figure 2 shows a power
trace that an attacker can easily discern the squaring and multiplying operations of
RSA encryption and visually read the secret key from the power trace. To easily
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prevent SPA attacks, operations should be kept independent from the secret keys
and intermediates [4].
Figure 2: SPA Against Unprotected Binary Exponentiation [1]
2.2.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Differential power analysis, pre-
sented by Kocher [4], is a very common and very powerful side channel attack. In
contrast to SPA, where few traces are needed to directly infer secret material, DPA
may require hundreds to thousands of traces to statistically correlate operands to key
guesses. Since DPA attacks require little knowledge about the underlying encryption
implementation, they are the most popular type of power attack [6]. Based on key
guesses, an attacker calculates an expected intermediate bit, and checks whether the
difference between the mean traces partitioned according to this bit differ. DPA is
based on the fact that unique operands create different switching activity and power
consumption.
2.2.2.1 Difference of Means. As outlined in [4], an attacker may
create a key hypothesis and selection function to separate the traces into two groups.
These two groups are averaged to eliminate random noise, hoping that there exists
some statistical similarities in both group. Next, subtract the two groups from each
other. This result leaves a differential trace, as seen in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Difference of Means [2]
As seen in Figure 4, if the key guess was incorrect the resultant trace will be flat
randomness, but if the key guess was correct the differential trace will contain spikes
at points of correlation verifying the correct key guess.
Figure 4: Differential Traces Showing Correct vs. Incorrect Key Guess
Successful DPA attack depends entirely on being able to distinguish a correlation
spike from the noise floor of the differential trace. Given Equation 1 [4], it is clear
that the differential trace will become less noisy as more traces are collected. This
effect is because uncorrelated events diminish by a factor of 1√
n
.
lim
n→∞
∆D [j] ≈ 0 (1)
Where n is the number of traces collected and ∆D [j] is the differential trace.
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2.2.2.2 Correlation Power Analysis. Correlation power analysis re-
quires attackers to calculate an expected intermediate value and check for statistical
correlation within the captured power traces. There are many variants of this at-
tack using either the Hamming Weight (HW) of the intermediate value, Hamming
Distance (HD), zero value model, etc [6]. These attacks depend heavily upon being
able to calculate the correct intermediate values, seen in Equation 2 [6].
ri,j =
∑D
d=1(hd,i − h̄i) · (td,j − t̄j)√∑D
d=1(hd,i − h̄i)2 ·
∑D
d=1(td,j − t̄j)2
(2)
Where r is the coefficient of correlation,
D is the number of traces,
h is the HW, h̄ is the average HW,
t is a power trace sample, t̄ is the average power,
i is the number of samples in j power traces.
Using this equation, the correlation coefficient is computed across all i samples within
j power traces for all possible key guesses looking for a spike in correlation. Using
the HW power model usually yields better results than difference of means.
2.2.2.3 Higher Order Differential Power Analysis. Data masking,
as described in section 2.3.3, is an effective way to defeat DPA. However, higher
order differential power analysis is able to defeat masking countermeasures. Second-
order differential power analysis (SODPA) as shown in [18], [19] exploits the power
consumption between two intermediate values sharing the same mask. There is no
direct correlation between input message and masked intermediate value, but there
is correlation between two intermediate values with the same mask. Higher order
differential power analysis’s effectiveness is directly related to the number of masks
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used and frequency of generating new masks. Since masking is computationally
expensive, SOPDA is usually the highest order attack needed [6].
2.2.3 Timing Attacks. In [20] Kocher shows how observing the time re-
quired for private key operations may allow an attacker to find the secret keys. Much
like power consumption in SPA, if the timing is dependent on the secret key, the time
variance can be calculated and can help in identifying the correct key guess. This
attack can be defeated by making all operations consume an equal amount of time,
but this process is difficult due to cache misses, instruction timing, etc. Kocher
suggests exponent blinding as discussed in Section 2.3.3.
2.2.4 Electromagnetic (EM) Attacks. Electromagnetic Attacks (EM) [17]
exploit electromagnetic radiation that is emitted from the cryptographic system. As
transistors switch and consume power, electrical current traveling along wires emit
EM radiation. EM probes are capable of collecting localized power consumption.
EM attacks are also able to scan and find desired frequency hot spots to avoid other
system noise. Once an attacker has collected EM power traces, they complete SPA
and DPA as previously outlined. These attacks are often referred to as Simple EM
analysis (SEMA) and differential EM analysis (DEMA).
2.2.5 Comparative Power Analysis (CPA). The authors of [21] propose
the new title of “Comparative Power Analysis” for a growing class of power attacks.
These attacks are active chosen message attacks that generate intermediate collisions
during cryptographic operations. By observing the power consumption over several
traces during the collisions, an attacker is able to match trace patterns and infer
which operation was accomplished and thus the secret key.
2.2.5.1 Doubling Attack. This attack [11] is based on the fact that
encrypting messages X (mod N) and X2 (mod N) has the potential to generate
intermediate collisions between encryption cycles. When a collision occurs, the result
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is the same intermediate value i2 loaded into registers as some other encryption
operation i1. If the power consumption and operation performed on i1 is known, an
attacker is able to tell if the operation performed on i2 was the same or different
(i.e., square or multiply). In Table 1, the grey values show collisions.
Table 1: Doubling Attack Example
i Key Encrypt X Encrypt X2
1 1 (1)2 (1)2
1 ∗X 1 ∗X2
2 0 (X)2 (X2)2
3 0 (X2)2 (X4)2
4 1 (X4)2 (X8)2
X8 ∗X X16 ∗X2
Recall that left-to-right binary exponentiation, Algorithm 2 has an additional
multiply for exponent bits of 1. Table 1 shows that if the i − 1 key bit is 0, a
collisions between X2i−1 and Xi exists. This process can be repeated to reveal all key
bits. Note that because of the difference in which order the squaring and multiplying
is accomplished in binary exponentiation, this attack only works for left-to-right
implementation. This attack is the first known to distinguish between left-to-right
and right-to-left algorithms.
2.2.5.2 Yen’s Attack. Similarly to the doubling attack, Yen’s attack
[22] also relies on a chosen message pair to create intermediate collisions. This attack
takes the form of choosing a message pair X (mod N) and −X (mod N).
Table 2 shows that when the key bit i is 0 a collision can be observed at i + 1 for
both X and −X operations.
2.2.5.3 Homma et al. Attack. This attack [21] requires a chosen
message pair Y and Z such that Y α ≡ Zβ (mod p) to create intermediate collisions
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Table 2: Yen’s Attack Example
i Key Encrypt X Encrypt −X
1 1 (1)2 (1)2
1 ∗X 1 ∗ −X
2 0 (X)2 (−X)2
3 0 (X2)2 (X2)2
4 1 (X4)2 (X4)2
X8 ∗X X8 ∗ −X
at arbitrary points in time. Using modular math described in detail in [21], Homma
et al. generate an example message pair Y 24 ≡ Z3 (mod p)
Table 3: Homma’s Attack Example
i Key Encrypt Y Encrypt Z
1 1 (1)2 (1)2
1 ∗ Y 1 ∗ Z
2 1 (Y )2 (Z)2
Y 2 ∗ Y Z2 ∗ Z
3 0 (Y 3)2 (Z3)2
4 0 (Y 6)2 (Z6)2
5 0? (Y 12)2 (Z12)2
6 SorM (Y 24)2 or Y 24 ∗ Y
Table 3 assumes the operation and power consumption for squaring Z at i = 3
is known, and an attacker seeks to compare against Y at i = 6. Since a collision
was generated at Y 24 ≡ Z3 (mod p) at i = 3 and 6, an attacker can discern whether
the power signature at i = 3 matches i = 6 (same operation, key bit is 0) or
power is different (different operation, key bit is 1). Homma et al. present example
of successful attacks on binary (up and down), windowing (constant and sliding),
square-and-multiply-always, Montgomery powering ladder, and other highly regular
algorithms.
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2.2.6 Fault Attacks. Conducting a fault attack consists of interrupting a
cryptographic device (e.g., clock glitch, induced bit flips, etc.) at a specific point in
time and monitoring its reaction [23]. RSA was the first cryptosystem to be targeted
by fault attacks [24]. One very well known attack is the safe error [25] attack. This
attack is used on countermeasures containing dummy operations, such as the square-
and-multiply always algorithm. By locally inserting a fault before the multiplication
operation, an attacker can check the output to determine if the fault propagated. If
the fault does not propagate, the multiplication operation was a dummy operation
and the key bit is 0. If the fault propagates, the result from multiplication was
taken and the key bit is 1. This attack is viable for all countermeasures that include
dummy operations.
2.2.7 Big Mac Attack. In [26], Walter describes an attack on sliding win-
dow exponentiation. The Big Mac Attack compares the power consumption of each
multiplication operation within a trace against the power consumption of the pre-
computations at the beginning of the algorithm, looking for a match. This attack is
conducted within a single trace, which has inherent advantages. Exponent blinding
countermeasures, as described in Section 2.3.3, are rendered useless since they cre-
ate randomness between traces not within them. Also, since more cross checking is
possible as the key size increases, this attack becomes more viable with larger keys.
2.3 Countermeasures
In general, side channel analysis countermeasures fall into two groups: hiding
and masking [6]. Hiding methods include injecting noise, inserting dummy opera-
tions, inserting delay, shuffling order of operations, dual rail logic, etc. Masking coun-
termeasure integrate some randomness into the data such that they are “masked” to
reduce correlation with the input text. It is the goal of designers to hide the power by
making it completely random or by flattening. In [27], the authors present a power
sensing amplifier able to sense instantaneous power consumed and dissipate power
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through a shunt to maintain a constant power consumption. There have also been
many modifications to the Montgomery modular multiplication for increased pro-
tection, including [28] and [29]. The remainder of this section discusses six common
countermeasure approaches.
2.3.1 Square-And-Multiply-Always. As described in Section 2.2.1, when
secret material determines branching operations, information is vulnerable to SPA
and timing attacks. Also mentioned previously, an easy way to avoid this leakage is
to ensure encryption programs are written to have a constant execution path. The
simplest method to modify binary exponentiation to include a constant path is with a
Square-And-Multiply-Always algorithm, such as the one seen in Algorithm 5. Notice
that the operations are now independent of the secret material. While this does help
prevent SPA type attacks, the dummy multiplication now make this countermeasure
vulnerable to fault attacks such as safe error. These countermeasures are considered
hiding countermeasures.
Algorithm 5 Square-and-Multiply Always [30]
INPUT: base n and exponent e = (et, et−1...e1, e0)2
OUTPUT: ne
R := 1;
for i = k − 1 downto 0 do
R0 := R ·R (mod N);
R1 := R0 ·X (mod N);
R := Rei
end for
return R0
2.3.2 Montgomery Powering Ladder. Peter Montgomery’s “Power Lad-
der” [31] can be used as an efficient way to speed up exponentiation multiplication.
As seen in Algorithm 6, the powering ladder has the added advantages that it is reg-
ular and contains meaningful multiplication and squaring each cycle (i.e, no dummy
operations). This algorithm is also a great candidate for parallel computing, as
discussed and analyzed in [32].
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Algorithm 6 Montgomery powering Ladder
INPUT: base n and exponent e = (et, et−1...e1, e0)2
OUTPUT: ne
R0 := 1;R1 := X;
for i = 0 to k − 1 do
if ei = 1 then then
R0 := R0 ·R1 (mod N);
R1 := R1 ·R1 (mod N);
else
R1 := R1 ·R0 (mod N);
R0 := R0 ·R0 (mod N);
end if
end for
return R0
Since the powering ladder is “regular” like square-and-multiply-always, it is protected
from SPA, and since there are no dummy operations, the powering ladder is also
immune to safe error attacks.
Similar to the Montgomery Powering Ladder, Joye presents several highly reg-
ular algorithms in [33]. These algorithms include the same security features of the
Montgomery Powering Ladder, but also being right-to-left algorithms they protect
against the Doubling Attack [11] and Big Mac Attack [26].
2.3.3 Masking. Masking countermeasures seek to create independence be-
tween the power consumption and true operations. To defeat simple power analysis,
one’s goal is to make the execution path constant and independent of the secret keys.
To defeat DPA, a system must additionally create independence between the power
consumption and the message being operated on. This goal can be accomplished by
masking, which combines the input data or secret exponent with some randomness
such that the HW of the intermediate operands will not correlate between traces. A
common method of masking for modular exponentiation is to blind the exponent [6].
This step is accomplished by adding some random multiple of Φ(n) to the secret
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decryption exponent d. Adding a multiple of Φ(n) will change the operands but the
modular operation will ensure the plaintext is correct.
dmasked = d+ v × Φ(n) (3)
Where v is a random value.
In [34], the authors combine blinding with exponent segmenting for increased
protection. It is also possible to mask the data itself prior to operations with the
secret key. For example, multiply the ciphertext c by some random value v before
decrypting via exponentiation with the private key.
cmasked = v × c (4)
Since ciphertext c is simply me (mod n), this yields:
cmasked ≡ v×me·d (mod n)
decryption⇒ (cmasked)d ≡ vd ×me·d (mod n)⇒ vd ×m
(mod n).
An attacker can easily pull off vd at the end of the decryption operation, which
leaves the original plaintext m. These masks can also be combined; [35] presents
triple masking where the exponent, input data, and operations are all masked.
Masking does not protect against SPA, and the effectiveness of masking depends
on frequency of mask change and the mask length. Additionally, as you can see in
Algorithms 3 and 4, there are precomputations, additional memory, and post com-
putations required. These requirements makes masking a computationally expensive
countermeasure.
2.3.4 Noise Injection. As seen in Equation 5 [6], adding noise lowers the
SNR thus requiring more traces to successfully mount a power analysis attack.
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SNR =
V ar(Exploitable Signal)
V ar(Switching Noise + Electrical Noise)
(5)
In [36], Messerges et al. take an in depth look at noise effects. As previously
seen in Equation 1, as the number of traces collected increases the variance of ran-
dom noise decreases. Noise can be generated via random number generators, ring
oscillators, garbage functions, etc. One must ensure that the noise is close to the
cryptographic operation’s clock frequency and spread throughout the circuit. Naive
noise injection attempts can be frequency filtered or bypassed by using EM probes
to pinpoint the true power signal of the cryptographic circuitry.
2.3.5 Dual-Rail Logic (DRL) and Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL).
DRL and WDDL are logic level countermeasures to balance power consumption.
As seen in Figure 5, this logic takes the inputs a, b and their inverses ā, b̄, then
computes the output q and its inverse q̄.
Figure 5: Example of Dual Rail Logic Block
This logic helps mask by balancing the Hamming Weights of computations by
concurrently computing the complement, thus maximizing Hamming Weight switch-
ing for every operand. Work in [37] and [38] describes how to integrate dual rail logic
into design flows for synthesis. While dual rail logic implementations provide a level
of DPA security, increases in power consumption and area are significant [39].
2.3.6 Time Delay. Since DPA relies on correlation between power samples
at a fixed point in time across all power traces, alignment of traces is very important.
19
A cryptographic designer can use misalignment as a countermeasure. The use of
random delay insertion (RDI), can interrupt a process and vary at what point in
time intermediates are operated on. RDI creates misalignments, lowers correlation,
and drastically increases the number of traces needed for successful attack [40]. Since
inserting delays hurts performance, the maximum delay allowed is usually kept quite
short, [41] discuses methods to choose the optimum delay. When adding delays to
an operation, the total power consumed is spread out over different time periods.
By integrating over these periods instead of correlating on single clock cycles, an
attacker can correlate on the total power consumed each operation, independent of
delays.
2.4 Conclusion
We have shown a variety of attacks and countermeasures from within cur-
rent literature. Although we have focused on RSA, these attacks and countermea-
sures also apply to other public key encryption algorithms using multiply-and-square
(add-and-double) algorithms, such as elliptic curve cryptography, as surveyed in [42].
Given all known attacks, we have seen that implementing a specific countermeasure
may protect from one attack while creating vulnerabilities to another attack. Un-
doubtedly many more attacks and countermeasures will be developed in the future.
Until an implementation is able to create complete independence between operands,
intermediates, and secret keys, attackers will continue to develop successful attacks.
For further reading, [43–45] provide additional in depth analysis of power analysis
attacks.
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III. Methodology
The following chapter outlines the methodology used for design of experiments, as
well as developing a dynamic architecture capable of resisting SCA attacks.
3.1 Problem Definition
Current SCA attack countermeasures are largely static. Given enough time and
a sufficient number of power traces, static countermeasures can be broken as they
merely attempt to increase the difficulty of attack to an infeasible level. However,
if countermeasures are constantly changing, as in a dynamic algorithm, timing and
power consumption would be a “moving target”, making correlation between traces
much more difficult than static countermeasures.
3.2 Goals and Hypothesis
The goal of this research is to develop and synthesize an architecture on an
FPGA that is capable of protecting an RSA implementation from SCA attacks. The
hypothesis of this research is that a dynamic circuit is capable of randomizing timing
and power consumption in such a manner that SCA attacks are no more successful
than brute force attacks.
3.3 Approach
To accomplish the goals of this research, dynamic architecture is developed to
introduce timing and power randomization into the circuit. This goal is accomplished
via two approaches: randomizing the radix of Booth multiplication and randomizing
the window size in exponentiation.
3.3.1 Randomizing Multiplication. Basic binary multiplication is accom-
plished by repeated iterations of addition and shift operations. In contrast, the
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Booth Multiplier [46] codes operands in such a way to skip unnecessary addition
steps. By increasing the radix of the Booth Coding, it is possible to shift twice per
cycle, thus halving the required cycles to complete multiplication. This research ex-
ploits this concept by developing a variable radix encoding Booth Multiplier. Driven
by a pseudorandom number generator, this multiplier shifts a random number of bits
each cycle. This random shifting induces randomness in the timing of operand use,
randomizes power consumption, and multiplication completes in a nondeterminis-
tic number of clock cycles. This process also causes alignment of traces to be lost,
making correlation much more difficult.
3.3.2 Randomizing Exponentiation. As binary multiplication can be seen
as repeated addition operations, binary exponentiation can be seen as repeated mul-
tiplication. Using multiple bit exponentiation in a windowing fashion [10] randomizes
how many key bits are used for exponentiation at each step. This approach adds
another layer of randomness in timing and power consumption.
3.4 System Boundaries
The dynamic RSA encryption hardware is the System Under Test (SUT),
shown in Figure 6. The SUT is composed of four major components: a Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA), the RSA encryption algorithm, a processor used for
peripheral communication, and the dynamic RSA implementation. The Component
Under Test (CUT) is the dynamic RSA implementation. This dynamic hardware is
synthesized from VHDL onto a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. The built in hardcore Pow-
erPC 440 processor is used for communication with the third party Riscure Inspector
software for plaintext/ciphertext exchange.
3.4.1 FPGA. The hardware platform used for this research is a the Xil-
inx Virtex-5 FX FPGA. VHDL code is synthesized using the Xilinx design suite
and downloaded to the board for hardware configuration. The characteristic of an
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Figure 6: System Block Diagram
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FPGA make it an ideal research platform. FPGAs are easily reconfigured with new
iterations of hardware configurations and allow for rapid development.
3.4.2 PowerPC Processor. The Xilinx Virtex-5 FX series used in this
research includes an on chip hardcore PowerPC440 processor. This processor is used
to run C code for communication between Riscure Inspector software to pass the
modulus, keys, and messages to the cryptographic system. This processor receives
the data and commands from Inspector and loads/reads the registers of the dynamic
RSA implementation.
3.4.3 Dynamic RSA Implementation. The dynamic RSA implementation
is the CUT. This implementation consists of a variable shift multiplier and variable
window size modular exponentiator, as introduced in Section 3.3. These subcom-
ponents randomize the timing and power consumption of cryptographic operations,
presumably making SCA attacks much more difficult. This research implements
the RSA encryption algorithm with various hardware changes in attempts to better
secure the implementation from SCA attacks.
3.5 System Services
The system in this research supplies two services: RSA encryption and SCA
obfuscation.
3.5.1 RSA encryption. This system completes RSA encryption on a plain-
text message given a modulus and key. This service is easily measured as pass/fail
via verifying correct ciphertext/plaintext pairs.
3.5.2 SCA obfuscation. The obfuscation service is a randomization of
timing and power consumption. This service is successful if the obfuscated power
trace results in less correlation than the baseline implementation. Any increase in
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protection is defined as successful service. The level of increased protection is later
evaluated and compared against other experimental runs.
3.6 Workload Parameters
The workload parameters of this system are: key length, constant versus ran-
dom plaintext, and the chosen number of encryption iterations.
3.6.1 Key Length. Key length drives the number of operations in modu-
lar exponentiation. Keys of longer length cause RSA encryption to compute more
multiplication steps and decrease throughput. SCA attacks bypass the functional
security of RSA. Which means an increase in key length results in only a linear in-
crease in SCA difficulty, as opposed to the exponential increase in brute force attack
difficulty when using a longer key. For ease of trace collection and processing, this
research implements 512-bit RSA with a 32-bit key. Since each key bit is attacked
individually, attacking this configuration is identical to attacking the first 32-bits of
larger key implementations.
3.6.2 Constant Versus Random Plaintext. Continuous identical messages
being encrypted is not realistic. However, in a research context, constant plain-
text messages allows for additional analysis. Given static SCA countermeasures,
the power signature and timing of two identical messages may be extremely similar.
This would allow an adversary to average out background noise. However, a dynamic
SCA countermeasure is capable of much different power signatures and timing when
encrypting two identical messages. Constant plaintext encryption also allows for the
standard deviation of various countermeasures to be compared, revealing which has
the most variability for identical messages, and allowing for experimental repeata-
bility.
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3.6.3 Number of Encryption Iterations. The probability of success for
many SCA attacks is a function of the number of message/power trace pairs cap-
tured. Increasing the pool of message/power trace pairs lowers noise and increases
correlation, both of which are critical for successful attack. Based on pilot studies,
the number of encryption iterations are chosen such that attacks are possible, but
without making successful attacks trivial. Setting a benchmark for number of encryp-
tion iterations is critical for useful analysis when comparing different experiments
and multiple hardware setups.
3.7 Performance Metrics
This research uses four performance metrics: layout area, encryption through-
put, and SCA correlation.
3.7.1 Layout Area. Many public key encryption systems are implemented
on smart cards and other constrained systems. These constrained systems drive
the need for small implementations. While this research is focused on protecting
an encryption system from SCA attacks, it is useless to develop a system that is
unrealizable. Therefore, the baseline implementation of RSA is compared against
the dynamic protection system to determine the area increase.
3.7.2 Throughput. Much like the area overhead metric, a protection
method that renders an encryption system too slow is also not practical. There-
fore, the throughput of encryption is also measured and compared to the baseline
implementation.
3.7.3 Correlation. The primary focus of this research is SCA protection
of an encryption system. Since obfuscation and protection are qualitative measure-
ments, a quantitative measurement of correlation is used to characterizes protection.
Correlation is a metric of how well an attempted attack is able to map key guesses
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to power traces. This metric is also used to compare against the baseline implemen-
tation.
3.8 System Parameters
System parameters are characteristics within the system boundary that affect
the performance metrics. The parameters of the SUT are background noise, maxi-
mum shift in multiplication, exponentiation window size, FPGA type, and processor
type.
3.8.1 Background Noise. With any experiment there is measurement noise.
Background noise is particularly important when conducting SCA attacks. This
research uses an inductive probe to non-invasively measure the power consumption
of the encryption system. These measurements are particularly sensitive to input
power supply noise, clock generating circuits, and ambient electromagnetic white
noise at the measured frequencies.
3.8.2 Randomized Radix Encoding Booth Multiplication. A primary ele-
ment of the CUT is a randomized radix encoding Booth multiplication. When the
radix is not randomized the multiplier operates as a normal Booth Multiplier. How-
ever, when radix of multiplication is randomized, it randomizes power and timing,
thus decreasing the correlation and increasing the obfuscation.
3.8.3 Exponentiation Method. The baseline implementation of the encryp-
tion hardware uses simple binary exponentiation. To increase obfuscation, multiple
bit windowing exponentiation methods are implemented.
3.8.4 FPGA Model. This research is conducted on a Xilinx Virtex-5
FPGA. Although this parameter is within the system boundary and remains con-
stant throughout this research, different FPGA families or manufacturers can affect
system performance metrics. Changes in underlying FPGA hardware may increase
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(or decrease) side channel leakage. This change in leakage is particularly true on the
Xilinx Virtex-5. As seen in Figure 3.8.4, several power capacitors on the bottom the
ML507 evaluation board produce a particularly clear power signal. Smaller power
signature changes could also be caused by using other FPGA manufacturers since
their proprietary tools will implement different place and route algorithms during
design synthesis.
Figure 7: Power Capacitors On Bottom of Virtex-5 ML507 Development Board
3.8.5 Processor Type. For communication, this research uses the hardcore
PowerPC440 processor on the physical Virtex-5 FX. Although this also remains a
constant throughout this research, different processors have the ability to affect power
signatures. Simply choosing another processor with a clock frequency significantly
different from the encryption CUT’s clock frequency allows an attacker to filter out
the processor noise, thus leaving a cleaner power signature of the CUT.
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3.9 Factors
This experiment uses two factors each with two levels. These factors and levels
are summarized in Table 4. The combination of static radix Booth multiplication
and binary exponentiation represent the baseline configuration for this research.
Table 4: Factors and Levels
Factors Levels
Multiplication Radix Static & Randomized
Exponentiation Window Size Binary & Randomized
As the levels of each factor are varied from static to randomized, the expected
result is an increase in randomization in power and timing. However, this is a trade
off since randomizing multiplication radix and increasing exponentiation window
size require more precomputations and increasingly complex hardware, decreasing
throughput and increasing power consumption.
3.9.1 Booth Multiplication Radix. To maximize randomization in timing
and power consumption, the radix of Booth encoding is changed within each mul-
tiplication operation. This factor is tested at two levels: static 2-radix (standard
Booth multiplication) and randomized radix.
3.9.2 Exponentiation Window Size. To build upon the randomized mul-
tiplier, a variable modular exponentiator introduces further randomness in timing
and power. The levels of windowing size of this exponentiator are standard binary
exponentiation and randomized window.
3.10 Evaluation Technique
The evaluation method of this research is direct measurement. The SUT is
coded in VHDL and synthesized onto a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA for each configuration.
Using Riscure’s Inspector SCA software as a driver, modulus, keys, and messages are
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sent via RS-232 to the SUT hardware on FPGA. At the beginning of the encryption
cycle, the SUT triggers a Lecroy WavePro 725zi oscilloscope to begin sampling a
Willtek 1207 inductive probe that is mounted directly above the FPGA. These power
traces are transfered from the oscilloscope to the Inspector software via Ethernet.
This setup is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Hardware Test Setup for Trace Collection
These power traces are imported into MATLAB for statistical analysis. Custom
software is run in MATLAB to compute correlation values and attempt a Hamming
Weight model Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. This method implements
a very common and powerful DPA attack to evaluate each experimental run. The
evaluation technique is validated on the baseline implementation. Results from the
DPA attack on the baseline implementation are compared against the known secret
key to validate successful attack. Subsequent experimental runs compare attack
results with their known secret keys to determine success of attack. Correlation
values are also compared against the baseline implementation to measure success
toward the protection goals and measures of obfuscation.
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3.11 Experimental Design
This research includes a full factorial design of experiments. Defining two
factors with two levels each yields four total experiments. These experiments are
replicated three times resulting in 12 total experiments. A 95% confidence interval
is used to evaluate this research. This confidence interval is chosen because it allows
for sufficient differentiation between experimental configurations.
3.12 Methodology Summary
The goal of this research is to determine whether a dynamic architecture on
an FPGA is capable of protecting an RSA implementation from SCA attacks. This
goal is accomplished by randomizing timing and power consumption through a vari-
able radix multiplier and variable window size exponentiator. By feeding the system
representative workload parameters, verifying system services fulfillment, and mon-
itoring system metrics, the results are indicative of the CUT’s performance. Using
two factors varied by two levels, four experiments are run in a full factorial experi-
ment. Each experiment is evaluated by a hardware test using real time encryption
and physical side channel collections. These results are validated against the base-
line implementation to determine the effectiveness of the dynamic architecture as a
defense against SCA attacks.
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IV. Countermeasure Design and Results
The following chapter outlines the design, simulation results, and results from real
world attacks on the dynamic architectural countermeasure developed in this re-
search.
4.1 Basic Hardware Design
In order to achieve the goals of of this research, to develop and synthesize an
architecture capable of protecting an RSA implementation against power analysis
attacks, the modular exponentiation operation is obfuscated. This obfuscation is
achieved by dynamic algorithms that randomize the power consumption and timing
of each calculation. Randomization is introduced at two levels within the architec-
ture, multiplication and exponentiation window size.
4.1.1 Booth Multiplication. Basic binary multiplication is accomplished by
repeated addition and shift operations. In contrast, Booth encoded multiplication
[46] recodes operands in such a way to reduce the number of costly addition steps.
Booth multiplication was chosen as the base multiplication architecture because it
allows for multiple bits to be encoded and operated on in a single iteration. As shown
in the flowchart in Figure 9, Booth multiplication tests the LSBs of the multiplier to
determine whether adding or subtracting the multiplicand is needed in each iteration.
Booth’s approach has a speedup benefit since arithmetic logic unit (ALU) operation
is only required on 0-to-1 and 1-to-0 transitions. For each iteration, the LSBs of the
multiplier are tested, ALU operation is completed (if needed), and multiplier and
product registers are shifted.
4.1.1.1 Modular Reduction. To complete modular multiplication, the
product of Booth multiplication must be reduced via a modulo operation. There are
two main classes of reduction techniques for modular multiplication: multiply-then-
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reduce and reduce-as-you-go [47]. This research implements the reduce-as-you-go
approach. Using the simple reduction method outlined in Algorithm 7 keeps the
product within the bounds of the modulus. This reduction algorithm is left-to-
right (MSB to LSB), which forces Booth encoding to also be preformed left-to-right.
Although it is not implemented in this research, this architecture does not prevent
implementing the popular Montgomery reduction [48].
Figure 9: Flowchart of Booth Multiplication [3]
The resultant modular Booth multiplier design is shown in Figure 10. The
Booth multiplier hardware concurrently computes all possible encoding results and
uses a multiplexer to choose the correct result based on the Booth encoding of the
MSBs of the multiplier. This result is fed into the modular reducer section of the
hardware. Here, all possible reductions are computed concurrently and the MSB of
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Algorithm 7 Modular Reduction
INPUT: Multiplier A, Multiplicand B, Modulus N
OUTPUT: A ·B (mod N)
Double the product register
If product register is > |N | modulus, Add/subtract to adjust
Add/Subtract via Booth operation
If product register is > |N | modulus, Add/subtract to adjust
the results determine the correct reduction. Using 2’s complement arithmetic, a MSB
of 1 represents negative numbers while MSB of 0 represents positive numbers. The
modular reducer selects the smallest nonnegative result. Therefore, this architecture
implements combinational logic that computes all possible Booth results, selects
the correct Booth result, computes all possible modular reductions, and selects the
correct modular reduction all in a single clock cycle.
Figure 10: Modular Booth Implementation
4.1.2 Modular Exponentiation. As reviewed in the multiply-and-square
algorithms presented in Section 2.1.1, exponentiation can be performed via multiple
modular multiplication steps. In order to complete the modular multiplications
R2 (mod N) and R · m (mod N), repeated operations using the modular Booth
multiplier hardware is used. This paper focuses on a modification of the Booth
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concept to dynamically randomize the calculation, which provides a level of SCA
protection to RSA.
4.2 Dynamic Architectural Countermeasures Design
The following sections outline the design of the dynamic architectural counter-
measure.
4.2.1 Randomized Radix Encoding Booth Multiplier. This research pro-
poses a custom design for a Booth multiplier with randomized radix encoding. In-
creasing the radix of Booth encoding causes more bits to be encoded each cycle,
thus further decreases the number of required cycles to complete multiplication.
The Booth encoding for radix 2, 4, and 8 are shown in Table 5. Note that all mul-
tiples of the multiplier M are trivial (i.e., shifts and 2’s complements) except the
multiple of three. However, the multiple of three is easily precomputed and stored
for later use.
Table 5: Table of Booth Encoding For Given Radix
Radix-2 M Radix-4 M Radix-8 M
00 0 000, 111 0 0000, 1111 0
01 M 001, 010 M 0001, 0010 M
10 −M 011 2M 0011, 0100 2M
11 0 100 −2M 0101, 0110 3M
101, 110 −M 0111 4M
1000 −4M
1001, 1010 −3M
1011, 1100 −2M
1101, 1110 −M
The radix of Booth encoding is randomly varied to provide protection against
SCA. Driven by a pseudorandom number generator, henceforth referred to as ran-
dom, the multiplier hardware randomly selects a radix at each iteration. This dy-
namic architecture induces randomness into the timing of operand use, randomizes
intermediate operands, randomizes power consumption, and multiplication com-
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pletes in a nondeterministic number of clock cycles. This randomization causes
alignment of traces to be lost, making correlation much more difficult.
4.2.2 Variable Window Exponentiator. Building upon the randomness in-
troduced via the randomized radix encoding Booth multiplier, the window size of the
exponentiator is also randomized. Starting with the general windowing Algorithm
4 from Section 2.1.1.2, the precomputations needed for a maximum window size of
3 are computed. Continuing into the second loop of the algorithm, the window size
k is randomly varied between 1, 2, or 3 each iteration. If window size 1 is chosen,
the algorithm simplifies to simple binary exponentiation. If a window size of 2 (or
3) is chosen, R = R4(R = R8) is computed and R = R · cdi is calculated using
the precomputed powers of c. Similar to randomizing the radix in Booth multi-
plication, randomizing the window size in exponentiation further introduces timing
randomness, operations randomness, and randomness in calculated intermediate val-
ues. Although this research presents an architecture with window sizes of 1, 2, and 3,
it is possible to increase the window size further for added randomization. However,
increasing window size is a trade off since increasing the window size exponentially
increases the number of precomputations and storage needed for very large integers.
4.3 Simulation Results
The discussed design is developed in VHDL and simulated using Mentor Graph-
ics ModelSim. The following sections discuss simulated execution of the randomized
radix encoding Booth multiplier, variable window exponentiator, and the combined
countermeasure.
4.3.1 Baseline. The baseline configuration consists of traditional Radix-2
Booth multiplication and simple binary exponentiation. Figure 11 shows a calcu-
lation of 146187 (mod 207) = 47. Note that timing is constant and all modular
multiplication operations take 11 cycles. This consistency is a best case scenario
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for an attacker. Calculating intermediate values based on a correct key guesses will
easily generate a correlation spike as all traces are aligned.
Figure 11: Baseline Configuration Simulation of 146187 (mod 207) = 47
4.3.2 Randomized Multiplication Simulation. Three computations of 146 ·
85 (mod 207) were simulated to show the induced randomness in timing and oper-
ations. The simulation results are presented in Figure 12. It is clearly seen that all
three modular multiplication computations’ output arrive at the correct answer of
146·85 (mod 207) = 197. However, the simulations complete in 9, 5, and 6 iterations
respectively.
Figure 12: Three Simulations of 146 · 85 (mod 207) = 197
Table 6 presents the computations in tabular form in order to show the ran-
domness in the calculations, where the multiplier 85 is represented in binary. Notice
as each computation traverses from MSB to LSB of the multiplier, horizontal sepa-
rating lines show which bit(s) each cell operates on. Notice where cells end on the
same bit (horizontal lines line up), the calculated intermediate value is the same,
but where iterations end on different bits of the multiplier (horizontal lines do not
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Table 6: Three Computations of 146 · 85 (mod 207) [Entire Table (mod 207)]
Multiplier 1st Run Radix 2nd Run Radix 3rd Run Radix
MSB 0 P = 0 P = 0
22 · P = 22 · 0 = 0 4 = 000 P = 0 22 · P = 22 · 0 = 0 4 = 000
0 P + 0 = 0 23 · P = 23 · 0 = 0 8 = 0001 P + 0 = 0
P +M = 146
0 22 · P = 22 · 0 = 0
23 · P = 23 · 0 = 0 P +M = 0 + 146 = 146 4 = 010
1 P + 3M = 0 + 3 · 146 = 24 8 = 0101
23 · P = 23 · 146 = 133
0 P − 3M = 133− 3 · 146 = 109 8 = 1010
2 · P = 2 · 24 = 48 23 · P = 23 · 146 = 133
1 P −M = 48− 146 = 109 2 = 10 P + 3M = 133 + 3 · 146 = 157 8 = 0101
2 · P = 2 · 109 = 11
0 P +M = 11 + 146 = 157 2 = 01
2 · P = 2 · 157 = 107 23 · P = 23 · 109 = 44
1 P −M = 107− 146 = 168 2 = 10 P + 3M = 44 + 3 · 146 = 68 8 = 0101 2 · P = 22 · 157 = 7
P −M = 7− 146 = 68 4 = 101
0 22 · P = 2 · 168 = 51
P +M = 51 + 146 = 197 4 = 010 2 · P = 2 · 68 = 136 2 · P = 2 · 68 = 136
LSB 1 P −M = 136− 146 = 197 2 = 10 P −M = 136− 146 = 197 2 = 10
line up) the addition operation and results are different. This effect is significant
because although the algorithm is computing the same answer, the power signature
will be vastly different not only because of the induced timing variance, but also the
switching activity from different operands in each iteration.
4.3.3 Randomized Window Exponentiator. A simulation of three calcula-
tions of 146187 (mod 207) are presented in Figure 13. First, all three iterations are
verified to arrive at the correct answer of 146187 (mod 207) = 47. Multiplication is
held constant, 11 cycles to complete, and the only variability is from the randomized
window. The timing variance of the randomized exponentiation leads to completion
in 231, 220, and 242 cycles respectively.
Figure 13: Random window Configuration Simulation of 146187 (mod 207) = 47
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Table 7: Three Computations of 146187 (mod 207) [Entire Table (mod 207)]
Exponent 1st Run Window 2nd Run Window 3rd Run Window
R = 1
MSB 0 R = 1 R = 1 R2 = 12 = 1
R2 = 12 = 1 R2 = 12 = 1 R2 = 12 = 1 2
0 R2 = 12 = 1 3 R2 = 12 = 1 3
R2 = 12 = 1 R2 = 12 = 1 R2 = 12 = 1
1 R ·M = 1 · 146 = 146 R ·M = 1 · 146 = 146 R ·M = 1 · 146 = 146 1
0 R2 = 1462 = 202 R2 = 1462 = 202 1 R2 = 1462 = 202
R2 = 2022 = 25 R2 = 2022 = 25 R2 = 2022 = 25 2
1 R2 = 252 = 4 3 R ·M = 25 · 146 = 131 1 R ·M = 25 · 146 = 131
R ·M3 = 4 · 98 = 185 R2 = 1312 = 187 R2 = 1312 = 187
1 R2 = 1872 = 193 R ·M = 187 · 146 = 185 1
R2 = 1852 = 70 R ·M3 = 193 · 98 = 77 2
1 R ·M = 70 · 146 = 77 1 R2 = 1852 = 70
R2 = 702 = 139 2
0 R2 = 772 = 135 R2 = 772 = 133 1 R ·M2 = 139 · 202 = 133
R2 = 1352 = 94 2 R2 = 1332 = 94
1 R ·M1 = 94 · 146 = 62 R2 = 1332 = 94 R ·M = 94 · 146 = 62 1
R2 = 622 = 118 R2 = 942 = 142 2 R2 = 622 = 118
LSB 1 R ·M = 118 · 146 = 47 1 R ·M3 = 142 · 98 = 47 R ·M = 118 · 146 = 47 1
More interestingly, the tabular calculation shown in Table 7 is inspected to
see the countermeasure’s effect on intermediate calculations. Because intermediate
calculations, power consumption, and timing are of such importance to DPA attacks,
this randomized modular exponentiation architecture is a countermeasure to defeat
SCA attacks. Again take notice where cells end on the same bit (horizontal lines
line up), the calculated intermediate value is the same, but where iterations end on
different bits of the exponent (horizontal lines do not line up) results are different.
4.3.4 Combined Countermeasure Simulation. To maximize the power and
timing randomization of the countermeasure, the randomized Booth multiplier and
the randomized exponentiator are combined. Three calculations of 146187 (mod 207)
are once again simulated and presented in Figure 14. First, the simulations are
again verified to have computed the correct answer of 146187 (mod 207) = 47. This
configuration combines the timing variance from both the previous countermeasures.
The combined timing variance of the randomized multiplication and exponentiation
lead to completion in 117, 106, and 119 cycles respectively. These results validate
via simulation that this proposed dynamic architectural countermeasure successfully
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randomizes timing, randomizes intermediate values, and causes large misalignment
in traces. These randomizations all increase SCA attack difficulty.
Figure 14: Three Simulations of 146187 (mod 207) = 47
4.4 Hardware Trace Results
The simulation results from the previous sections are the result of VHDL code.
This code was subsequently synthesized onto a Xilinx Virtix-5 FPGA using Xilinx’s
XPS Design Suite. As previously described in depth in Section 3.10, the crypto-
graphic hardware on the FPGA interfaces with the Riscure Inspector’s 3rd party
software and a Lecroy Oscilloscope to collect power traces. All configurations are
synthesized as 512-bit RSA cryptosystems. To aid in the speed of trace collection
and processing, only a 32-bit key is used. The smaller key does not effect the method
binary multiplication. It only reduces the number of modular multiplications and
shortens the overall encryption time for testing purposes.
4.4.1 Baseline Configuration. The first configuration to be tested is the
baseline configuration. Figure 15 shows the raw power trace. Because the traces are
collected via EM probe, they are very noisy. Figure 16 shows the frequency spectrum
of the raw trace. Clearly, the traces are riddled with higher harmonics of the 12.5
mHz clock frequency. Using DSP, the noisy traces are filtered with a bandpass filter
centered on the 12.5 mHz clock frequency (10.5-14.5 mHz bandpass). Figure 17
presents the post processed frequency spectrum, and Figure 18 shows the resultant
trace with much less noise. Notice how the beginning and end of the filtered trace
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show very little power consumption, while the unfiltered trace shows unrelated noise
at those times.
Figure 15: Baseline Configuration - Raw Trace
Figure 16: Baseline Configuration - Spectrum Analysis
Figure 17: Baseline Configuration - Bandpass Filtered Spectrum
Figure 18: Baseline Configuration - Post Filtering
Zooming in to the processing of the first few bits, it is possible to clearly define each
block of execution in the filtered trace, Figure 19. Figure 20 shows several bits from
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two encryption operations with the same plaintext but different keys. Notice there is
no discernible timing or power difference in the squaring or multiplying operations.
This validates that the implementation is resistant to Simple Power Analysis (SPA).
However the baseline configuration is still very susceptible to Differential Power
Analysis (DPA).
Figure 19: Baseline Configuration - Zoomed, Filtered
Figure 20: Baseline Configuration - Immune to SPA
Lastly, Figure 21 shows the ending of five power traces. Notice that the timing is
perfectly aligned. The aligned power spikes create a very favorable condition for SCA
attacks. Figure 21 is used as a benchmark to gauge other configurations’ timing.
4.4.2 Randomized Radix Encoding Booth Multiplier. This section presents
hardware test results from the randomized radix encoding Booth multiplier. The
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Figure 21: Timing Consistencies of the Baseline Configuration
randomized radix encoding Booth multiplier configuration uses static binary expo-
nentiation built upon a Booth multiplier that randomly selects between radix of 2,
4, or 8. The raw trace shown in Figure 22 has higher power spikes than the base-
line configuration. This higher power consumption is due to multiple copies of the
ALU hardware needed to compute the additional operands seen in the higher radix
columns of Table 5. These power spikes can be seen more easily in Figure 23 after
removing noise from the trace via a bandpass filter centered on the 12.5 mHz clock
frequency. Zooming in to examine the first few bits of encryption, shown in Figure
24, the power spikes clearly show the hardware is front loaded and high switching
activity draws more power as soon as new operands are shifted into the registers.
In order to show the misalignment of traces, Figure 25 presents the ending
times of five power traces of the randomized multiplier configuration. In this sample
of traces, the misalignment is very apparent when compared to the baseline ending
times previously shown in Figure 21. Taking the standard deviation of 10,000 col-
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Figure 22: Randomized Multiplier Configuration - Raw EM Power Trace
Figure 23: Randomized Multiplier Configuration - Filtered Trace
Figure 24: Randomized Multiplier Configuration - Zoomed, Filtered
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lected traces, Figure 26 shows a normal distribution of ending times from 1, 027µs to
1, 043µs. This distribution is as expected and reflects the system randomly selecting
a radix each iteration. The majority of traces have a mixture of high radix and low
radix iterations, while few traces randomly select mostly high radix (i.e., shorter
overall runtime) or mostly low radix (i.e., longer overall runtime). Thus, a normal
distribution of end times is expected.
Figure 25: Timing Misalignment of the Randomized Multiplier Configuration
4.4.3 Random Exponentation Window Configuration. The next section de-
tails the hardware test for the variable windowing configuration. This configuration
uses static 2-radix Booth multiplication, but varies the exponentiation window size
between 1, 2, or 3. The raw power trace, shown in Figure 27, appears to be more sim-
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Figure 26: Randomized Multiplier Configuration - 10,000 Trace Standard Devia-
tion
ilar to the baseline configuration than the randomized multiplier configuration. This
similarity is due to the underlying hardware. The random window configuration,
like the baseline configuration, contains only radix-2 Booth multiplier hardware. It
is expected that the random window power trace is most similar to the baseline
configuration since the random window countermeasure implements randomization
at the finite state machine (FSM) level, not at the low level multiplication hard-
ware. After applying the same bandpass filter to reduce noise, Figure 28 shows the
resultant power trace. Notice the dip in power consumption starting at 250µs. The
operations before this dip are the precalculations (i.e., the first loop of Algorithm 4).
The dip in power is due to the first few operations following initializing the variable
R = 1. Squaring R at this point drives very little switching activity, thus draws very
little power consumption (e.g., R2 = R ∗R = 1∗ 1 = 1). This effect can more clearly
be seen in Figure 29. Note that window size of 1 requires R2 before multiplying,
where window sizes of 2 and 3 require calculating R4 and R8 respectively. Figure 29
also displays the randomness in window size selection.
Figure 27: Randomized Window Configuration - Raw Power Trace
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Figure 28: Randomized Window Configuration - Filtered Trace
Figure 29: Comparison of Initial Calculations in Random Window Configuration
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Once again, it is interesting to examine the ending times of this configuration.
Figure 30 shows the much increased timing variance of this configuration. Notice
that while the ending times are different, there is no misalignment; the deep down-
ward power spikes are all aligned. However, the number of execution “blocks” the
traces takes to complete is randomized. Looking at the standard deviation of 10,000
collected traces, Figure 31 shows a normal distribution of ending times from 2, 060µs
to 2, 350µs. Notice the randomized window configuration has a timing variance of
300µs where as the randomized multiplier only generates 15µs of variance. This
increased timing variance will make alignment and correlation more difficult in SCA
attacks.
Figure 30: Timing Misalignment of the Randomized Window Configuration
4.4.4 Combined Countermeasure Configuration. This dynamic counter-
measure combines the randomized radix encoding Booth multiplier hardware with
the randomized exponentiation window architecture. The raw power trace shown
in Figure 32 looks similar to both the independent countermeasures. It exhibits
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Figure 31: Randomized Window Configuration - 10,000 Trace Standard Deviation
higher power spikes from the increased randomized Booth hardware, as well as a dip
in power immediately following the precomputations. These attributes can be seen
more clearly in the filtered power trace in Figure 33.
Figure 32: Combined Countermeasure Configuration - Raw Power Trace
Figure 33: Combined Countermeasure Configuration - Filtered Trace
Once again, the ending times of several power traces are examined to comment
on trace misalignment and timing variance. Figure 34 presents the ending times
of the combined countermeasure. While ending times appear very similar to the
variable window configuration, the addition of the randomized multiplier has added
low level trace misalignment. Notice that the large power spikes are no longer aligned
as they were with only the random window configuration. Similarly to previously
shown, the standard deviation of 10,000 traces yields a normal distribution of ending
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times and can be seen in Figure 35. While the combined countermeasure produces a
large variance in ending times like the random window configuration, the addition of
the randomized multiplier “smooths” the edges such that bell curve is more evenly
distributed.
Figure 34: Timing Misalignment of the Combined Countermeasure Configuration
Figure 35: Combined Countermeasure Configuration - 10,000 Trace Standard De-
viation
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4.5 Hardware Attack Results
The following section details the development and results from conducting a
real world side channel power analysis attack. This attack is a correlation power
analysis attack, as previously described in Section 2.2.2.2. First, a collection of
10,000 power traces with random ciphertexts are decrypted. During decryption, EM
probes are used to collect emissions related to power consumption. These emissions
and ciphertexts are saved for processing the attack. This attack setup is identical for
each configuration under attack. Next, a key bit guess is made, and an intermediate
value is calculated based on this key guess. The Hamming Weight (HW) of 8-bits
of the resultant intermediate guess is calculated. These 10,000 8-bit HW guesses
are statistically correlated to the collected EM power traces using Equation 2 from
Section 2.2.2.2. If the resultant correlation trace contains a correlation spike, the
power consumption matches the HW values and the key guess is verified as correct.
If no correlation spike is seen, the key bit guess is incorrect.
4.5.1 Attack On Previous AFIT Research. This research is a continuation
of previous work [1]. To begin working with SCA, the previous work was attacked
and broken to prove attack validity. A power trace from the previous research’s
implementation is shown in Figure 36. Note that this implementation is also vulner-
able to simple power analysis. The result of the correlation power analysis attack
on the previous research’s implementation can be seen in Figure 37. This attack
generates a very large correlation spike many times larger than the noise floor. This
very successful attack gives an attacker high confidence that the correct bit has been
guessed.
4.5.2 Attack on Baseline Configuration. The first implementation from
this research to be attacked is the baseline configuration. As expected, correlation
power analysis is able to easily recover the key. Without any randomizations of
intermediate values, randomizations in power, or trace misalignments, the attack is
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Figure 36: Previous Work’s SPA Susceptible
Figure 37: Previous Work Broken Using Correlation Power Analysis
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successful as seen in Figure 38. To provide the reader an idea of an unsuccessful
attack, Figure 39 presents the correlation trace with an incorrect key guess. Notice
the noise floor remains the same but a correlation spike is not present. Therefore,
the baseline configuration is not protected against correlation power analysis.
Figure 38: Correlation Attack on Baseline Configuration - Correct Guess
Figure 39: Correlation Attack on Baseline Configuration - Incorrect Guess
4.5.3 Attack On Randomized Radix Encoding Booth Multiplier Configuration.
Since the randomized multiplier configuration has elements of low level misalign-
ment and randomization, the effectiveness of the SCA attack is expected to be de-
graded. Looking at Figure 40, the attack still generates a correlation spike. However,
since there is timing randomness the correlation is spread out among many clock cy-
cles. This causes the correlation spike to be shorter and wider instead of the narrow
tall spike seen in the attack against the baseline configuration. For an “apples to
apples” comparison, the correlation trace is set to same y-axis scale as the baseline
attack, Figure 41. It is now much more apparent that the spike is smaller than the
baseline attack. Although the randomized multiplier countermeasure significantly re-
duced the correlation spike, the spike is still much larger than the noise floor. Thus,
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the attack is successful and this countermeasure is not protected against correlation
power analysis attacks.
Figure 40: Randomized Multiplier Configuration - Correct Guess
Figure 41: Correlation Spike on Baseline Y-Axis Scale
4.5.4 Attack On Random Exponentiation Window Configuration. Based on
the ending times variance examined previously, the random window configuration is
expected to provide increased protection. Figure 42 shows a small area of increased
correlation near the 1, 200µs mark. This correlation area is much more disperse than
the previous two configurations, indicating that the random window configuration
provides the best protection so far. Comparing the attack results on the same y-axis
scale of the baseline attack, Figure 43 shows it is extremely difficult to make out
the correlation near the 1, 200µs mark. While this configuration is still considered
vulnerable in this 10,000 trace correlation power analysis attack, the configuration
would be considered protected if it were possible to limit the amount of power traces
an attacker could collect to a smaller number.
4.5.5 Attack On Combined Countermeasure Configuration. Combining the
low level randomness of the random multiplier with the architectural randomness of
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Figure 42: Random Exponentiation Window Configuration - Correct Guess
Figure 43: Correlation Spike on Baseline Y-Axis Scale
the random window exponentiatior proves to be the best chance at protection. Figure
44 presents the results from attacking the combined countermeasure configuration.
There is no correlation discernible from the noise floor as expected near the 500µs
mark. Because the correlation cannot be distinguished from the noise floor in the
correlation trace, this configuration is considered protected in this attack. Further-
more, when compared on the same y-axis scale of the baseline attack (Figure 45),
this result looks nearly identical to the incorrect key guess trace previously shown in
Figure 39, indicating the implementation is protected. This configuration is declared
protected against the 10,000 trace correlation power analysis attack. In an effort to
uncover the breaking point of this countermeasure the number of traces collected
was increased by an order of magnitude. Requiring about 48 hours of constant CPU
processor time, 100,000 traces were collected, filtered, and attacked. The results
from this 100,000 trace correlation power analysis attack are shown in Figure 46.
There is no discernible difference in the correct vs. incorrect key guess in this at-
tack. Therefore, the combined countermeasure is also considered protected against a
100,000 trace correlation power analysis attack. However, an attacker able to collect
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many orders of magnitude more traces may be able to reduce the noise floor such
that the correlation is discernible, and the combined countermeasure configuration
is no longer protected. Although, collection of traces can be limited to reasonable
amounts with sufficiently often key changes.
Figure 44: Combined Countermeasure Configuration - Correct Guess
Figure 45: Correlation Spike on Baseline Y-Axis Scale
Figure 46: Combined Countermeasure Configuration - 100,000 Trace Attack
4.5.6 Comparisons. In order to clearly see each configuration’s effect on
the attack, Figures 47 and 48 compare the results of attacks on independent and
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identical y-axis scales, respectively. While the correlation is not discernible in these
countermeasures, it is not hidden; the correlation is simply misaligned. This research
seeks to force attackers to attempt a brute force type correlation attack. If an
attacker knew each random window size and radix, they could easily align/filter
traces to reveal the correlation. Because these windows and radixes are randomized,
an attacker would be forced to attempt correlation on all possible combinations of
window sizes and radixes (i.e., brute force) for each key bit. Future advances in the
field could produce a countermeasure with side channel brute force security better
than the brute force security of the underlying encryption scheme.
Figure 47: 10,000 Trace Correlation Power Analysis Attack Compared
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Figure 48: 10,000 Trace Correlation Power Analysis Attack Compared - Same
Scale
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4.6 Metrics
Regardless of a countermeasure’s security, no implementation is realizable if
it does not meet the users needs. A perfectly secure system is useless if it is too
large to be manufactured or cannot provide the deciphered information in a timely
manner. This section presents the results of the following metrics: execution time,
FPGA area size, and level of increased protection.
4.6.1 Execution Time (ET). The first metric examined is execution time.
Any countermeasure that increases encryption/decryption execution time decreases
throughput. All configurations in this research are synthesized and running at 12.5
mHz. Although Table 8 shows that the randomized multiplier and combined coun-
termeasure contain more path delays and must be run at the slower clock rate, there
is actually very little performance penalties involved for these countermeasures. Tak-
ing into account the execution times shown in Figure 49, the 55% speedup achieved
by the randomized multiplier and combined countermeasure offset the 50% decrease
in clock frequency.
Table 8: Table of Maximum Frequency of Configurations
Configuration Maxiumum Frequency
Baseline 25.2 mHz
Random Multiplier 12.9 mHz
Random Window 26.4 mHz
Combined Countermeasure 13.7 mHz
4.6.2 Required FPGA Area. The next metric discussed is FPGA area re-
quired. Area and execution time are common inverse tradeoffs. A system may be
designed to operate quicker with parallel hardware, but this comes at an increased
layout area size for the additional hardware. As detailed in Table 9, the random-
ized multiplier and randomized window countermeasure affect different aspects of
area. Because the randomized multiplier has many additional ALUs, the multiplier
requires many more look up tables (LUTs) to make these calculations. However, the
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Figure 49: Execution Time of Configurations Compared (Running At 12.5 mHz)
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randomized window countermeasure requires additional precomputations and stor-
age. This increased storage drives an increase in flip flops (FFs). As expected, the
combined countermeasure contains the combined increases in both FFs and LUTs.
Table 9: Table of FPGA Area Required For Each Configuration
Configuration Flip-Flops LUTs Increased FF Increased LUTs
Baseline 10425 14791 N/A N/A
Random Multiplier 10462 29827 0.4% 101%
Random Window 13576 18075 30% 22%
Combined Countermeasure 13613 34156 31% 131%
4.6.3 Protection. Protection, as defined for this research, is measured as the
number of power traces required to recover secret key bits. Based on the 10,000 trace
correlation power analysis attack presented in the last section, the following graphs
detail how the correlation spike and noise floor change as more traces are collected.
Recalling the relationship presented in Equation 1 from Section 2.2.2.1, increasing
the number of traces collected decreases noise and increases SNR of the desired
leakages. Examining the baseline configuration, Figure 50 reveals that beyond 30
traces the noise floor is reduced to a level that reveals the correlation. Attacks
attempted with less than 30 traces will be unsuccessful as it will be impossible to
discern the correlation spike from the noise floor. However, attacks with greater than
30 traces will be successful because an attacker can distinguish the correlation spike
in correct key bit guesses. Also notice that the correlation spike neither increases
nor decreases as excess power traces are collected, the noise floor simply shrinks
further. This reduction is due to the static nature of the implementation. There is a
constant amount of leakage. An attacker only needs to collect enough traces to lower
the noise floor to a level that allows distinguishment of the correlation spike. This
demonstrated inherent weakness plagues all static countermeasures, such as dual-rail
logic.
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Figure 50: Baseline - Correlation Vs. Noise Floor
The next configuration inspected is the randomized multiplier. Figure 51 shows
some increased protection. This configuration requires 80 power traces for successful
attack. Notice how the correlation no longer remains at a constant level as more
traces are collected. The changing power consumption and misalignments introduced
by the random multiplier continually decrease correlation. Although the noise floor
was able to be reduced at a steeper slope, revealing the correlation, this tenet of
dynamic countermeasures highlights the promise of their use for SCA obfuscations.
Figure 51: Randomized Multiplier - Correlation Vs. Noise Floor
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Moving on to the randomized window configuration, Figure 52 presents the
results of the attack. It is immediately apparent that the randomized window con-
figuration is able to maintain correlation below the noise floor up until 2,000 traces.
The increased timing variance previously shown in Figure 31 allows this configuration
to spread the correlation over a larger time frame, which decreases its impact.
Figure 52: Randomized Window - Correlation Vs. Noise Floor
Next, the results of an attack on the combined countermeasure are examined,
Figure 53. Within the original 10,000 trace attack, it is not possible to distinguish
the correlation. Even when the attack was increased by an order of magnitude to
100,000 traces, no correlation was revealed. For the attack setups presented in this
research, the combined countermeasure is considered protected. However, if the
amount of traces used in the attack was greatly increased, it would likely reveal the
correlation at some point.
Finally, Table 10 is presented to summarize the increased levels of protection
of each configuration. This research concludes that the only major trade off penalty
for this countermeasure’s increased protection is over doubling the required LUTs.
Notice that the increase in FFs and LUTs for the combined countermeasure is only
a summation of the two individual countermeasure, but the increase in protection
is many times greater than their summation. Combining the two forms of random-
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Figure 53: Combined Countermeasure - Correlation Vs. Noise Floor
ness (low level hardware randomness and FSM randomness) creates an synergistic
increase in protection.
Table 10: Table of Number of Traces Required for Successful Attack
Configuration Number of Traces Increased Protection
Baseline 30 N/A
Random Multiplier 80 166%
Random Window 2,000 6,500%
Combined Countermeasure +100,000 +300,000%
4.7 Conclusions
Table 11 is presented to summarize the increased protection and associated
trade-offs of each configuration.
Table 11: Table of Tradeoffs
Configuration Increased FFs Increased LUTS Increased ET Increased Protection
Baseline N/A N/A N/A N/A
Random Multiplier 0.4% 101% Negligible 166%
Random Window 30% 22% Negligible 6,500%
Combined Countermeasure 31% 131% Negligible +300,000%
As stated previously, this research is driven by the fact that current static
SCA countermeasures rely on hiding the signals, not protecting them. These coun-
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termeasures’ success are based upon the quality of equipment and quality of signal
an attacker is able to capture. In contrast to the existing countermeasures, the dy-
namic architectural countermeasure presented in this paper does not rely on hiding
signals among noise. This approach is much more in line with Kerckhoffs’s princi-
ple [10], which states that a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about
the system, except the key, is public knowledge. The new countermeasure presented
in this paper makes no attempt to hide power consumption, only to randomize it.
Because the signal is not hidden beneath noise, the probability of successful attack is
not determined by the sophistication of an attacker’s equipment or quality of signal
they capture. This randomized approach forces an attacker into a brute force side
channel attack in which the attacker must calculate every possible combination of
intermediate values for every trace. Therefore, this research lays a foundation for
exponential difficulty side channel attack protection. Assuming the correct trade off
choices are made with respect to performance and hardware area, it is conceivable
that large enough pools of radixes and window sizes could lead to a future system
with brute force side channel attack difficulty no worse than the underlying encryp-
tion algorithm’s brute force security, thus rendering side channel attacks impractical.
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V. Conclusion
The following chapter summarizes this research’s completed objectives, contributions
to the field of study, and options for future work.
5.1 Completed Objectives
The objectives laid out for this research are obtained as follows:
5.1.1 Dynamic RSA Design. The primary objective of this research is
to further the side channel attack countermeasure field of study. This objective
is achieved through design of a dynamic architectural countermeasure to protect
RSA encryption against side channel attacks. Unlike many popular static counter-
measures that merely hide the leakage beneath noise, this dynamic countermeasure
randomizes timing and power consumption such that correlation is much more dif-
ficult. A randomized radix encoding Booth multiplier induces lower level hardware
timing misalignments and randomizes power. Building upon the randomized multi-
plication, a randomized window exponentiatior further misaligns the traces and ran-
domizes intermediate calculated values. The combined countermeasures produced
by this research lay a foundation for future SCA countermeasures that may have
side channel attack difficulty of at least the brute force security of the underlying
encryption scheme, thus rendering SCA attacks useless.
5.1.2 Implementation on FPGA. The newly designed dynamic counter-
measure was implemented to prove viability and testing. This implementation was
completed on a Xilinx Virtix-5 FPGA. VHDL code was synthesized using Xilinx’s
XPS design suite and downloaded to the FPGA. The 3rd party Riscure Inspector
software was used to facilitate key passing and random plaintext generation. Traces
were compared against the key values and resulting ciphertext to verify correct im-
plementation and encryption results.
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5.1.3 Real World Attacks. The last objective of this research is to conduct
real world attacks on the countermeasures. These attacks are the ultimate veri-
fication and provide quantifiable levels of increased protection. Correlation power
analysis attacks were conducted and the results verify the increases in protection for
each countermeasure designed.
5.2 Contributions
The completed research objectives provide numerous contributions to the field
of side channel attack protection.
5.2.1 Developed Theoretical Countermeasure Verified by Attacks. This
research lays the groundwork for new dynamic algorithm class of SCA countermea-
sures. Not only developing a theoretical model for the countermeasure, but also
implementing them and conducting real world attacks to verify their validity.
5.2.2 Developed Custom MATLAB Script for Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) Attacks. This research developed custom MATLAB scripts capable of
extracting secret keys. This contribution provides a method of SCA attack without
relying on licensing of the 3rd party Riscure Inspector software. These MATLAB
scripts not only mirror Inspector’s capabilities, but also exceed them in attack au-
tomation.
5.2.3 Developed a Method of Comparison Power Analysis Attacks. A pro-
cess of trace collection and post processing was developed to conduct CPA attacks.
This contribution allows for another class of real world side channel attacks to be
executed on in house implementations for testing.
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5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Develop Additional Attacks. Developing the capability to execute
additional real world attacks in house would allow for more thorough validation
of new countermeasures. Procuring the needed testbed to induce hardware faults
would also allow future in house research to characterize fault attack tolerance of
new countermeasures.
5.3.2 Speeding MATLAB Processing. Although the MATLAB scripts de-
veloped by this research are capable of completing attacks, the scripts run painfully
slow. Riscure Inspector software uses Java classes optimized for very large integer
(i.e. 512-bit) manipulation and uses CUDA cores on video cards to increase through-
put. Mirroring the calculation speed of Inspector in MATLAB would allow for faster
processing enabling more attacks to be attempted.
5.3.3 Brute Force Work. A major argument in favor of this dynamic
countermeasure is the need for brute force search to realign the power traces for
successful attack. A modified implementation of the countermeasure that could
record all randomized selections would allow for a simulated brute force attack.
Knowing each random choice at the time of attack would enable research into the
exponential security of these countermeasures.
5.4 Summary
This research has designed, implemented, and validated a dynamic architec-
tural countermeasures to increase protection of RSA encryption from side channel
power analysis attacks. The combined countermeasure increases the number of traces
required for successful attack (i.e., increases protection) by over 300,000% without
suffering any throughput penalties. The cost for this tradeoff is only increased FPGA
area. This research provides a foundation for future SCA countermeasures based on
dyanimcally randomizing power at all levels of an implementation’s architecture
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that may one day provide side channel attack protection greater than the underly-
ing encryption algorithm’s brute force security, thus rendering side channel attacks
impractical.
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